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The presence/absence of Intellectual Disability (ID) is considered to be the most critical
factor affecting outcomes in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). However,
the question of the specific nature of ID in ASD has received little attention, with the
current view being that ID is a comorbid condition (i.e., one that is unrelated in etiology
and causality from the ASD itself). Recent advances in developmental neuroscience, high-
lighting the importance of early exposure to social experiences for cognitive development,
support an alternative view; that ID in ASD might emerge as a consequence of severe
social-communication deficits on the experience-dependent mechanisms underlying neu-
rocognitive development. We tested this prediction in two independent samples of young
children with ASD (Ns=23 and 60), finding that children with greater ASD severity at
an initial assessment were more likely to present with poorer cognitive outcomes at a
later assessment, irrespective of initial cognitive level. The results of this proof of principle
study suggest that ASD symptom severity contributes to the extent to which the environ-
mental input required to support “typical” brain development can be processed by the
individual, so that the risk of developing ID increases as the number and severity of ASD
social-communicative impairments increase.
Keywords: autism, intellectual disability, cognitive development, comorbidity, developmental cognitive neuro-
science
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual Disability (ID) is characterized by significant limi-
tations in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills, with
age of onset before age 18 years (Schalock et al., 2010). Approxi-
mately two thirds of individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders
(ASD) have co-occurring ID (Dykens and Lense, 2011), and the
presence/absence of ID is considered to be the most critical factor
affecting outcomes in this population (Howlin et al., 2004; Hen-
ninger and Taylor, 2013). However, the question of the nature of
the association between ID and ASD has received little attention.
One common view in the current conceptualization of ASD is
that ID is a comorbid condition that occurs over and above ASD
symptomatology in some individuals with ASD (Nordin and Gill-
berg, 1998; Cashin et al., 2009; Matson and Worley, 2013). The
term “comorbidity” is used in medicine to denote clinical enti-
ties “unrelated in etiology or causality to the principal diagnosis”
(e.g., cancer diagnosed after a stroke), and therefore conceptually
distinct from complications or sequelae of the principal diagnosis
(Greenfield, 1989; Iezzoni, 1994, p. 52; see also Lilienfeld et al.,
1994). Other authors suggest that ID and ASD are related in terms
of their etiology (i.e., that which causes ID also causes ASD) but
they are not themselves causally related (e.g., Waterhouse, 2013).
The perspective according to which ID is a distinct additional
entity to ASD is reflected in many aspects of ASD research. For
example, many studies report that participants with “comorbid
ID” were excluded, to allow for the study of “pure autism”; that is,
autism not confounded by ID.
The main argument supporting the idea of ID as a comorbid
feature of ASD is the notion that a person can have either one
without also having the other. While we do not disagree that such
dissociation is possible, we argue that the presence of such a situa-
tion is not sufficient to demonstrate the independence of the two
conditions. We will provide a number of counter arguments sup-
porting an alternative view that severe ASD symptoms increase the
risk of an individual also developing ID. We propose a theoretical
model indicating the specific mechanisms through which the risk
of having ID is related to the severity of ASD symptoms, and we
provide novel data from two independent studies to support this
model.
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE ASSOCIATION OF ID AND ASD
The notion of ID and ASD as independent clinical entities reflects
a modular conceptualization of cognition, according to which
one processing domain/module (in the case of ASD, the process-
ing of social information) can be selectively disrupted without
negative repercussions on the rest of cognitive system (that is,
other domains will not be affected). According to this framework,
“pure autism” is the exemplification of a “modular impairment”
involving selective difficulties with social processing, while in the
situation of “autism confounded by ID,” additional (non-social)
processing domains happen to be disrupted as well, albeit for a
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different reason (i.e., the occurrence of a distinct clinical entity
which is causally unrelated to ASD). However, an alternative to
this account on the relationship between ID and ASD can be
advanced within a developmental neuroscience framework (see
Thomas and Karmiloff-Smith, 2002). Recent research emphasizes
the experience-dependent nature of early brain development (e.g.,
Grossmann and Johnson, 2007; Kuhl, 2007; Makinodan et al.,
2012), pointing to the crucial role of early exposure to social
experience opportunities for cognitive development. For example,
education and active engagement in a socially rich environment
is associated with both structural and functional brain changes,
whilst rearing in minimally stimulating environments (e.g., some
orphanages) has a negative impact on brain functioning (Blake-
more and Frith, 2005; Cicchetti and Cohen, 2006; Nelson, 2007).
Given the relevance of social input for normal brain devel-
opment (Kuhl, 2007), it has been hypothesized that a decrease
in the attentional and processing weight assigned to social infor-
mation, in children with ASD, might preclude the usual social
experiences that are necessary for “normal” cognitive develop-
ment during early sensitive periods (Dawson, 2008; Klin et al.,
2009; see also Hobson, 2004). This process would affect a num-
ber of different domains. For example, as noted by Whitehouse
et al. (2007) language impairments in this population might be
a secondary consequence of ASD symptoms. If infants with ASD
do not have access to the appropriate input that supports the effi-
cient organization and specialization of the brain in neurotypical
development, this might ultimately result in the child also having
an ID. A corollary of this model is that the more severe the ASD
symptoms, the more the child would be “at risk” for developing
an ID. Therefore, according to this view, ID is not a comorbid
condition (i.e., an unrelated clinical entity), but a developmental
consequence of the virtual “social deprivation” caused by the ASD
symptoms. In this model, we do not imply that the presence of
ASD necessarily results in ID in all children, regardless of symp-
tom severity. Rather, we argue that ASD symptoms put the child
“at risk” for ID, and that this risk will increase as the severity of
ASD symptoms increase. One objection to this perspective is that
the severity of ASD and ID are unrelated, so that ID can be equally
present in children with mild or severe ASD symptoms. We turn
to recent literature suggesting that this is not the case.
EMPIRICAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE ASSOCIATION OF ID AND ASD
If the notion that ID is a comorbid feature of ASD is correct, then
measures of ASD severity and of cognitive abilities should be inde-
pendent in the ASD population, so that a child could have mild
ASD with severe ID, or severe ASD with mild ID. Empirical data,
however, appear more consistent with our reasoning, showing that
ID is more likely to be present in children with more severe ASD
symptoms than in those with milder presentations. A review by
Dykens and Lense (2011) using diagnostic categories from DSM-
IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) indicates that IQ
levels vary substantially across diagnoses under the umbrella of
the Pervasive Developmental Disorders (i.e., ASD), with more
severe forms associated with lower cognitive scores. Furthermore,
a recent longitudinal study by Gotham et al. (2012), involving
a sample of 345 participants, documented that individuals with
more severe autism symptoms had lower IQ, leading the authors
to conclude that autism characteristics and cognitive functioning
are not entirely independent features.
Another argument supporting our position derives from recent
research on intervention in this population by Dawson et al.
(2010). This study, focusing on the efficacy of the Early Start Den-
ver Model – an intervention program specifically targeting ASD
symptoms in very young children – found that children under-
going this program experience significant gains on measures of
cognitive development and adaptive behavior. If ASD symptoms
and ID (defined by low cognitive ability and adaptive functioning)
are independent features, how is it that intervention targeting ASD
symptoms results in gains in cognitive and adaptive functioning?
CURRENT AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
Based on the aforementioned arguments, we conducted a proof
of principle study testing the hypothesis that severity of ASD in
early childhood is associated with poorer development of cogni-
tive abilities. We did this by collating secondary data across two
independent samples of young children with ASD, each followed
longitudinally. We predicted that (1) children with more severe
ASD symptom presentation would be more likely to also demon-
strate lower overall levels of cognitive ability, and (2) that these
children would make slower gains in cognitive skills across time.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Data for this study were available from two pre-existing, inde-
pendent samples of young children with ASD; one comprising
preschoolers with ASD diagnoses given by expert autism assess-
ment teams in the community, and the other comprising toddlers
with ASD prospectively identified and diagnosed from a low-risk,
community-based sample following developmental surveillance.
Ethics approval for each of these was provided via the La Trobe
University Human Ethics Committee; HEC 10-084 and HEC06-
94, respectively. We present data from each study as collected across
two visits (hereafter, Time 1 and Time 2). Initial characterization
data for each sample at Time 1 is presented in Table 1.







Chronological age (months) 40 (11) 22–60 25 (2) 23–33
ADOS-Ga total algorithm 14.9 (4.6) 6–21 14.0 (4.1) 6–20
MSELb Age-equivalence
(months)
Overall mental age 21.4 (12) 8–54.5 16.7 (3.4) 8–26
Subscales
Visual reception 22.6 (8.9) 10–54 18.9 (3.2) 10–29
Fine motor 26.3 (10.7) 13–68 21.6 (3.7) 9–30
Receptive language 17.4 (10.7) 1–47 12.2 (5.1) 1–25
Expressive language 19.8 (11.5) 3–43 14.2 (4.1) 3–26
aAutism diagnostic observation schedule – generic (Lord et al., 1999).
bMullen scales of early learning (Mullen, 1995).
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Sample 1: preschoolers with community-based ASD diagnosis
Data for 23 children with ASD (1 female), aged 22–60 months at
Time 1, were available from their enrollment and ongoing par-
ticipation at a community early intervention center (see Vivanti
et al., 2013). Children were accepted into the center on the basis
of having an existing (or provisional) ASD diagnosis given by
a community professional. This was confirmed at Time 1 via
administration of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule –
Generic (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 1999) by an independent clinician
with demonstrated research-reliability in the use of this measure.
All participants were free from other medical conditions, and
any visual, hearing, or motor impairment. Cognitive abilities for
each child were assessed at entry to the early intervention center
(Time 1) and again 1 year later (Time 2).
Sample 2: toddlers with ASD identified via developmental
surveillance
Data for 60 toddlers with ASD (15 female), aged 23–33 months
at Time 1, were drawn from a larger pool of participants identi-
fied within the Social Attention and Communication Study (SACS;
Barbaro and Dissanayake, 2010; Barbaro et al., 2011). This longitu-
dinal, community-based developmental surveillance study investi-
gated the utility of a set of early markers in infants and toddlers for
the prospectively identification of ASD at 12-, 18-, and 24 months
of age. A sample of 110 children were identified at “at risk” for
ASD on the SACS, and assessed at 24 months using the ADOS-G
(Lord et al., 1999) and ADI-R (Lord et al., 1994), administered by
a researcher with demonstrated reliability in using these measures.
Of these, 89 toddlers were identified as having ASD at 24 months
of age (Time 1), with 60 returning for a follow-up assessment
2 years later (Time 2; mean age 50 months, SD= 4.8). The current
sample therefore comprises those 60 toddlers for whom an ASD
diagnosis was initially given and for whom longitudinal cognitive
ability data were available at follow-up.
MEASURES
Common measures of autism symptoms and cognitive ability
were used to characterize children across the two samples. As
already noted, the ADOS-G (Lord et al., 1999) was adminis-
tered at Time 1 for all children (early intervention entry for
the preschoolers, and initial diagnostic assessment visit for the
toddlers). This standardized tool is considered the gold-standard
observational measure for use in quantifying symptoms relevant
to a diagnosis of ASD; that is, impairments in the areas of com-
munication, reciprocal social interaction, and restricted/repetitive
behaviors. While serving to inform diagnostic decisions around
ASD, ADOS-G total algorithm scores (comprising communica-
tion and social interaction items only) can also be considered to
index relative symptom severity, in so far as a range of scores
is available beyond that considered to signal the “cut-off” for
an ASD. Total algorithm scores for Module 1 (minimally ver-
bal young children) plausibly range from 0 to 26, with a cut-off
score of 7 used to identify an ASD (and with higher scores index-
ing greater symptom expression). As shown in Table 1, Time 1
ADOS scores varied substantially across the available range within
each of our samples, showing clear individual differences on this
measure.
Cognitive ability was assessed for all children at both Time
1 and Time 2 (following 1 year of early intervention for the
preschoolers, and at a 2-year follow-up, post diagnosis, for the
toddlers). This was achieved using the Mullen Scales of Early
Learning (MSEL; Mullen, 1995), a standardized measure of abil-
ity across four domains important for cognitive functioning in
early development; Visual Reception, Fine Motor, Receptive Lan-
guage, and Expressive Language. The MSEL yields standardized
T -Scores for each domain. However, as these can be of limited use
for samples where children have ASD, as floor-level performance
is often observed, we instead report Age-Equivalence (AE) scores
here. These scores demonstrate good variability and can be mean-
ingfully interpreted (i.e., a typically developing child should be
expected to have an AE score in line with their own chronological
age, and to make gains of 12 months’ AE over a 1-year period).
As shown in Table 1, Time 1 MSEL scores varied substantially,
showing clear individual differences on this measure within each
sample.
DESIGN AND ANALYTIC PROCEDURE
Associations between autism symptom presentation and cognitive
ability were evaluated, separately within each sample, using Pear-
son Product Moment Correlation Coefficients. First, we examined
concurrent associations among our indices of autism symptoms
and cognitive ability at Time 1. Second, we computed a measure
of gains in cognitive ability between Time 1 and 2 assessments
(subtracting the former from the latter, for each child) and then
examined the association of ASD symptoms at Time 1 with this
measure of cognitive AE gains.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
SAMPLE 1: PRESCHOOLERS WITH COMMUNITY-BASED ASD
DIAGNOSIS
For the sample of 23 preschoolers with ASD, a significant associ-
ation, of large effect size, was evident between ASD symptoms
and cognitive AE scores assessed concurrently at Time 1 (i.e.,
early intervention intake); r =−0.49, p= 0.010, d = 0.9. Longi-
tudinally, a significant association, of larger effect size, was evident
for this sample between Time 1 ASD symptoms and gains in cogni-
tive AE made between Time 1 and Time 2 assessments; r =−0.65,
p= 0.001, d = 1.2. Average cognitive AE scores increased from
21.4 months (SD= 12) to 30.4 months (SD= 18) over the 1-year
period, representing an average growth of 9 months within this
time. The results from the correlational analyses indicated that
those preschoolers with more severe ASD symptoms also presented
with lower concurrent cognitive ability. Moreover, they also had
fewer gains in cognitive ability over the following year. Figures 1
and 2 present individual data-points for these associations.
SAMPLE 2: TODDLERS WITH ASD IDENTIFIED VIA DEVELOPMENTAL
SURVEILLANCE
Among the sample of 60 toddlers prospectively identified via
developmental surveillance and meeting criteria for ASD at 2 years
of age, a significant association, of medium effect size, was evident
among concurrent ASD symptoms and cognitive AE assessed at
Time 1 (i.e., initial diagnostic assessment); r =−0.52, p< 0.001,
d = 0.7. A significant association, also of medium effect size, was
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FIGURE 1 | Scatterplots for 23 preschoolers with community ASD diagnoses presenting associations amongTime 1 ASD symptoms and concurrent
cognitive age-equivalence scores.
FIGURE 2 | Scatterplots for 23 preschoolers with community ASD diagnoses presenting associations amongTime 1 ASD symptoms and gains in
cognitive age-equivalence over a 1-year follow-up period.
also evident for this sample between ASD symptom presentation at
Time 1 and gains in cognitive AE made between Time 1 and Time
2 assessments; r =−0.32, p= 0.007, d = 0.7. On average, cognitive
AE scores increased from 16.7 months (SD= 3.4) to 37.5 months
(SD= 11.5) over the 2-year period, representing an average growth
of 20.8 months during this time (or around 10.4 months per year).
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As with our findings for the preschoolers with ASD, and in keep-
ing with our hypothesis, toddlers with more severe ASD symptoms
showed lower cognitive ability at concurrent assessment and also
made more limited cognitive gains across the following 2 years.
These associations are shown in Figures 3 and 4, and a summary
of our data across both samples is presented in Table 2.
CROSS-SAMPLE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Across these two independent samples of young children with ASD,
similar magnitude of associations between Time 1 ASD symptom
scores and concurrent cognitive AE are noted. However, effect sizes
for the correlations between Time 1 ASD symptoms and longitudi-
nal gains in cognitive AE were of quite different magnitude, albeit
presenting a negative association for both groups. A somewhat
stronger effect was observed here for our sample of preschoolers,
followed across a 1-year period, with a more modest one apparent
for our toddlers who were observed across a 2-year period. This
variation in effect sizes may be due to sample differences. First,
while our toddler sample included a greater number of individ-
uals (N = 60) than our preschool sample (N = 23), the former
comprised a relatively homogenous group, while the latter pre-
sented greater heterogeneity in terms of chronological age at each
assessment and Time 1 cognitive AE scores (see standard devia-
tion metrics in Table 1). Differences in the range of scores present
within the groups may account, at least in part, for the differing
magnitudes of effect size we observed. Variability in Time 1 ASD
symptom presentation was relatively well balanced across the sam-
ples. However, by Time 2, cognitive AE scores were more varied
in each of the groups. As such, this is unlikely to provide a full
explanation for our finding.
The most likely potential contributing factor for the difference
in effect size lies in the different intervals spanning Time 1 and
Time 2 assessments for each group. In the case of the preschoolers,
intake assessment to the community center was followed with an
outcome evaluation 1 year later. For toddlers, by contrast, ASD
diagnosis was made at a visit when children were ∼2 years of
age (having been referred to the study across infancy and tod-
dlerhood via developmental surveillance in the SACS) and the
follow-up visit was scheduled ∼2 years later. This longer-interval,
over which gains were evaluated, may explain the more modest
effect size observed here between early ASD symptom presentation
and change in cognitive AE ability.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Autism Spectrum Disorder is defined in terms of limitations in
social-communication and behavioral flexibility, and ID is defined
in terms of limitations in intellectual functioning and in adaptive
behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical skills.
Whilst the validity of ASD as a specific construct independent from
ID and other factors (e.g., language) is well established, the major-
ity of individuals with ASD also have co-occurring ID, posing the
problem of the nature of this association. One possibility, which is
widely accepted in the ASD field, is that ID represents a comorbid
condition in ASD (i.e., one that is unrelated in etiology and causal-
ity from ASD). In this paper, we outlined a number of theoretical
and empirical arguments indicating that this notion is question-
able. Whilst there is clear evidence that mild ASD symptoms are
compatible with normative or superior IQ, the evidence is less clear
with regards to severe ASD symptoms, with recent data (including
the novel data presented here) suggesting that the more “autism
FIGURE 3 | Scatterplots for 60 toddlers with ASD identified via developmental surveillance presenting associations amongTime 1 ASD symptoms
and concurrent cognitive age-equivalence scores.
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FIGURE 4 | Scatterplots for 60 toddlers with ASD identified via developmental surveillance presenting associations amongTime 1 ASD symptoms
and gains in cognitive age-equivalence over a 2-year follow-up period.






















Interval betweenTime 1 and 2 1 year 2 years
aAutism diagnostic observation schedule – generic (Lord et al., 1999).
bMullen scales of early learning (Mullen, 1995).
specific” symptoms a child has, the more at risk he or she is of
poor cognitive outcome. Moreover, early behavioral intervention
targeting ASD symptoms results in positive changes in IQ, again
indicating some inter-dependence, rather than independence, of
these two dimensions.
We argue that the presence of severe ASD symptoms is a risk
factor for low IQ, in the same way that severe hypertension or
severe obesity increases the risk of cardiovascular events (Flynn
et al., 2011). Advances in developmental neuroscience, emphasiz-
ing the experience-dependent nature of early brain development
(e.g., Grossmann and Johnson, 2007; Kuhl, 2007), allow us to
explain this association of ID and ASD from a neurodevelopmen-
tal perspective. Based on this framework, we suggest that ASD
symptom severity moderates the extent to which the environmen-
tal input required to support “typical” brain development can be
processed by the individual, so that the risk of poor cognitive devel-
opmental outcomes increases as the number and severity of ASD
social-communication impairments increase. That is, emerging
social-communication deficits early in development might deprive
the developing brain from receiving important environmental
inputs, with downstream effects on global cognitive development.
The result is lower IQ in those individuals with the most severe
ASD symptoms.
According to this perspective, we argue that the practice of
excluding children with ID in ASD research to study “pure autism
unconfounded by ID” is ill considered, just as studying the risk
of cardiovascular events in individuals who are slightly over-
weight, or who have mild presentation of hypertension, would
not be informative on the most relevant aspects affecting the
outcomes of individuals with those conditions. Rather, research
should target those factors that place affected individuals at an
increased risk of negative outcomes, by investigating the mech-
anisms underlying symptoms and their sequelae, and identifying
prevention/remediation strategies to foster positive developmental
outcomes.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There were several limitations of the current study. First, we do not
have data on participants’ adaptive behavior level, which form part
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of the criteria required for the diagnosis of ID. Second, whilst all of
the children involved in this study would likely have been enrolled
in community early intervention programs, we have not collected
details on the specific programs the children were involved in,
nor on the amounts of intervention being received. As such, this
potentially critical factor mediating the impact of ASD severity on
cognition could not be taken into account in the current study.
Future research will involve collecting data on adaptive behavior
and participation in intervention in order to build on the results
from the current study.
Whilst the aim of this proof of principle study was to test the
notion that the severity of ASD symptoms has a negative influence
on cognitive development, it is important to mention various other
risk factors that are known to affect cognitive development in other
groups of children. These include demographic factors, preterm
birth, maternal age and education, and birth weight, among oth-
ers (Zeanah, 2009). In order to disentangle the relative importance
of ASD symptom severity from that of other potentially signifi-
cant factors on cognitive development, more empirical research
is needed that utilizes prospective research designs and includes
larger sample sizes.
CONCLUSION
Intellectual Disability is known to result from a number of differ-
ent risk factors. Here, we have argued that the presence of severe
(but not mild) symptoms of ASD is one such risk factor, so that
ID is unlikely to be a comorbid condition to ASD but, rather,
one that is intimately linked to certain ASD presentations. Con-
sistent with Ockham’s razor (Popper, 1992), the presence of ID in
the majority of the ASD population, in particular in those indi-
viduals who are more severely affected with ASD, can be more
parsimoniously explained by positing a relationship between these
two frequently co-occurring clinical entities than by claiming their
independence. A developmental neuroscience framework provides
a good explanatory model on the nature of such a relationship,
indicating that it is plausible that children with very severe disabil-
ities affecting social understanding and social learning are more
vulnerable to poor cognitive outcomes (Coch et al., 2007). As the
poor outcomes associated with the presence of ID in ASD result in
large human and societal costs, it is important that future research
systematically investigate the risk and protective factors associated
with the development of ID in ASD. Indeed, excluding individ-
uals with ID from research in ASD only renders more difficult
the ultimate goal of fostering positive outcomes for individuals
with ASD.
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